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MASS TORTS AND THE PURSUIT 
OF ETHICAL FINALITY 
Lynn A. Baker* 
INTRODUCTION 
Judges, lawyers, and academics largely agree that comprehensive finality 
is a central goal of mass tort litigation and settlements.  More controversial 
is whether such finality is normatively preferable, inherently ethically 
problematic, or can be achieved through nonclass aggregate settlements 
without running afoul of the existing ethics rules.  This Article joins this 
important debate. 
Part I explains the special allure and complexity of finality in nonclass 
aggregate settlements for defendants, plaintiffs, and plaintiffs’ counsel.  
Part II sets out five core components of comprehensive finality commonly 
sought in these settlements.  These core components include (1) minimum 
participation thresholds and affirmations by plaintiffs’ counsel that they (2) 
will cease advertising for new clients with similar claims against the 
defendant; (3) will not represent any new, similar claimants; (4) will 
recommend participation in the settlement to all clients; and (5) will (seek 
judicial permission to) withdraw from representing any client who declines 
his or her settlement offer.  This part also discusses the limitations that the 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility (“the Rules of 
Professional Responsibility” or “the Rules”) currently impose on each 
component and the extent to which comprehensive finality is currently 
achievable as a practical matter.  It also provides a critical analysis of 
critiques of the ethics and desirability of each component recently offered 
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by various scholars.  Part III argues, notwithstanding these critiques, that 
comprehensive finality in nonclass aggregate settlements is both desirable 
and largely achievable within existing ethical constraints.  This Article 
concludes by proposing an amendment to ABA Model Rule of Professional 
Responsibility 5.6 that would relax the major problematic constraint and 
thereby arguably benefit defendants, plaintiffs, and plaintiffs’ counsel 
involved in such settlements. 
I.  THE SPECIAL ALLURE AND COMPLEXITY 
OF COMPREHENSIVE FINALITY IN MASS TORTS 
For both plaintiffs and defendants, resolution is the goal of litigation.  In 
mass tort litigation, however, the goal is not only resolution but 
comprehensive finality, which has special allure and presents special 
complexity for the parties.  For a mass tort defendant, the large number of 
claims involved means large potential liability and, therefore, a large 
potential “cloud” on the company’s accounting ledgers and share price.  
The incentives for the defendant to resolve all claims and thereby remove 
the cloud are clear.1  For the mass tort plaintiffs (and their contingent fee 
counsel), the special allure of comprehensive finality rests in the “finality 
premium” that the defendant can be expected to pay in exchange for true 
global peace.2  In addition, plaintiffs’ counsel may benefit from 
comprehensive resolution insofar as it provides them closure regarding 
ongoing expenditures of time and money needed to prosecute their clients’ 
claims against the defendant.3 
The allure of comprehensive finality for mass tort defendants, plaintiffs, 
and plaintiffs’ counsel is straightforward.  Achieving this finality, however, 
 
 1. Indeed, simply obtaining certainty as to the actual total cost of resolving all claims is 
useful for the defendant (and valuable for its shareholders), even if that total cost is 
significant.  To take one notable example, on the day Merck announced its $4.85 billion 
nationwide settlement of nearly 50,000 Vioxx claims in November 2007, its stock rose 2.3 
percent “even as the broader stock market was sharply lower.” Alex Berenson, Analysts See 
Merck Victory in Vioxx Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2007, at A1 [hereinafter Berenson, 
Analysts].  Interpreting such data is complicated, however.  The increase in the defendant’s 
share price upon announcement of a settlement might reflect a lower-than-expected total 
settlement amount, the savings in ongoing defense costs, and/or a rebound from a decline in 
the share price earlier in the litigation process. See, e.g., id. (noting that “[t]wo years ago, 
some analysts estimated that Merck would have to pay as much as $25 billion to settle Vioxx 
claims” and that settling the cases enabled Merck “to stop spending $600 million a year on 
its defense”); Alex Berenson, Jury Calls Merck Liable in Death of Man on Vioxx, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2006, at A1 (noting that the first trial of a personal injury case involving 
Vioxx resulted in a jury verdict of $253.5 million and caused Merck shares to fall 7.7 
percent). 
 2. See Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement 
Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733, 760, 760–63 (1997) (detailing reasons why defendants 
who settle group lawsuits “want finality and are willing to pay for it”); see also Howard M. 
Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 318–
20 (2011); Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the 
Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 412–18 (2014). 
 3. A partial settlement can leave a plaintiff’s firm or consortium with ongoing 
expenditures of time and money as it continues to prosecute the unsettled claims against the 
defendant. 
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is complicated.  A mass tort defendant has numerous complex 
considerations when deciding how best to resolve the many pending claims.  
A series of confidential, incremental, “global” settlements with individual 
law firms or consortia is one option.  The incremental approach runs the 
risk that plaintiffs’ attorneys receiving early settlements may use some of 
the proceeds to fund advertising for, and pretrial discovery related to, 
additional claims, thereby increasing the eventual number of viable claims 
and potentially the total amount to be paid by the defendant.  Similarly, 
ordinary media publicity surrounding the early settlements may 
independently cause additional potential claimants to hire an attorney and 
pursue their claims.  A comprehensive, “nationwide” settlement program is 
another option.  Although it may provide some of the same incentives for 
additional claimants to join the litigation, it will typically have a deadline 
for participation, which, as a practical matter, will cap the total number of 
claims to be paid.4 
Independently of the total number of claims ultimately paid under either 
settlement option, the incremental approach may enable the defendant to 
resolve groups of claims for some law firms at a lower per-claim average 
value than for others.5  This approach may reduce the defendant’s total cost 
of settling all claims relative to a nationwide settlement program if one 
assumes that the select group of plaintiffs’ counsel negotiating a nationwide 
settlement program are likely to be among the best bargainers and from the 
most well-capitalized law firms.6 
Whether a defendant ultimately negotiates a public, nationwide 
settlement program, as in Vioxx,7 or enters into multiple, confidential 
 
 4. A deadline for participation may cap the total number of claims as a practical matter 
simply because stragglers who later seek to hire counsel may find few, if any, interested 
plaintiffs’ attorneys.  From the perspective of a contingent fee plaintiffs’ attorney, the 
litigation costs, general transaction costs, and opportunity costs of such a belated individual 
representation are likely to exceed any potential recovery.  In some instances, the statute of 
limitations may have run, providing the defendant a useful hard stop to the number of 
potential claimants. 
 5. The comparison here is between similar claims across different law firms or 
consortia, such that the variable is the law firm or consortium rather than characteristics or 
qualities of the total inventory of claims represented by each. 
 6. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in 
Multidistrict Litigation:  The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) 
(manuscript at 13, 19, 34), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2724637 (providing empirical data that 
“[w]hen judges consider applicants for [multidistrict litigation] leadership positions, they 
focus on experience, cooperative tendencies, and an ability to finance the litigation—factors 
that favor repeat players,” that “attorneys with more appearances in proceedings are more 
likely to be appointed to leadership positions, and those in leadership design settlements,” 
and “settlement values may likewise reflect repeat players’ knowledge about previous 
awards, which helps prevent defendants from using information asymmetries to their 
advantage” (footnote omitted)) [https://perma.cc/XRK5-LWDB]. 
 7. See Settlement Agreement, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05-md-1657 (E.D. 
La. Nov. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Vioxx Settlement], http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/ 
documents/Master%20Settlement%20Agreement%20-%20new.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9B5-
DXHM].  The Vioxx settlement was most notable and the second earliest of the relatively 
few public, nonclass, personal injury aggregate settlements to date.  For a list of the handful 
of other public, aggregate settlements, see Burch & Williams, supra note 6.  There have been 
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“inventory” settlements with individual law firms or consortia of firms,8 it 
will need to work with the relevant plaintiffs’ counsel to craft a written 
settlement agreement.  Under either model of mass resolution, the 
settlement agreement will reflect both parties’ pursuit of comprehensive 
finality and its expected benefits for the defendant and the relevant group of 
claimants.  The next part takes up five core components of comprehensive 
finality that one might expect to see in an optimally comprehensive mass 
tort settlement agreement. 
II.  FIVE CORE COMPONENTS OF COMPREHENSIVE FINALITY 
IN NONCLASS MASS TORT SETTLEMENTS 
From the perspective of the mass tort defendant, an optimally 
comprehensive nonclass settlement likely would include five provisions in 
the agreement negotiated with the relevant plaintiffs’ counsel9:  (1) that the 
defendant has a unilateral option to terminate the settlement unless a 
specified number of claimants agree to participate in the settlement (a 
“walk-away” right or minimum participation threshold) and that the 
signatory plaintiffs’ attorney(s) will (2) recommend participation in the 
settlement to all potentially eligible clients, (3) not represent any new 
clients with similar claims against the defendant, (4) not advertise for new 
clients with similar claims against the defendant, and (5) (seek judicial 
permission to) withdraw from representing any client who declines his or 
her settlement offer under the agreement. 
From the perspective of the claimant, a settlement offer under an 
agreement that the mass tort defendant considers optimally comprehensive 
is likely to be larger than an offer under a similar agreement that lacks the 
above five restrictions.  The defendant should be willing to pay a premium 
for the finality provided by the optimally comprehensive settlement.10  
Indeed, even an ABA formal ethics opinion critical of one such restriction 
explicitly acknowledges “the fact that the defendant is willing to offer more 
 
vastly more personal injury mass torts resolved via multiple confidential inventory 
settlements. 
 8. Some “confidential” inventory settlement agreements are publicly available in 
redacted form as a result of being filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. See, 
e.g., Master Settlement Agreement § IV.H, In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 12-md-2325 (S.D. W. Va. June 14, 2013) [hereinafter AMS 
Settlement], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1100962/000110096213000038/ 
ex10144meshsettlementagree.htm [https://perma.cc/7CLF-THUY]. 
 9. Claimants covered by a settlement agreement will often be represented by multiple 
law firms that agree to share the fees that the claimant has contracted to pay pursuant to the 
attorney-client retainer agreement.  Typically, only one (or a small subset) of those law firms 
is a direct signatory to the mass tort settlement agreement under which the claimant receives 
a settlement offer.  This is true in both inventory settlements and in nationwide settlement 
programs. 
 10. Silver & Baker, supra note 2, at 760–63 (detailing reasons why defendants who 
settle group lawsuits “want finality and are willing to pay for it”). 
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consideration than it might otherwise offer in order to secure the covenant 
from the attorney not to represent” new clients.11 
If both the mass tort defendant and claimants prefer a nonclass settlement 
with the five provisions set out above, one might expect virtually all 
settlement agreements to include these provisions.  At present, however, the 
Rules of Professional Responsibility limit, to varying degrees, the ability of 
counsel for both sides to include such provisions in the agreements they 
craft.12  This part takes up each of the five provisions in turn, discusses the 
limitations that the Rules of Professional Responsibility currently impose 
on each, and examines the extent to which comprehensive finality is 
(nonetheless) currently achievable as a practical matter.  It also provides a 
critical analysis of existing critiques of the ethics and desirability of each 
component. 
A.  Minimum Participation Threshold 
The minimum participation threshold (or “walk-away” right) in a 
settlement agreement typically takes one of two forms.  Sometimes the 
agreement will state that “the Defendant shall have the right, in its sole 
discretion, to terminate this settlement if XX percent of the Claimants who 
are eligible to settle their claims under this agreement do not provide a 
valid, executed Release on or before the deadline of Day/Month/Year.”13  
Other times, this provision may impose different participation thresholds on 
claimants in two or more different injury categories, with a failure to meet 
any one of the thresholds affording the defendant the option to unilaterally 
terminate the agreement.14  Typically, a significant participation rate, 
sometimes as high as 100 percent, is required for the subgroup of claimants 
with the highest valued claims (and most serious injuries), with the lowest 
participation rate required for the subgroup with the lowest valued claims 
(and least serious injuries). 
Such walk-away provisions are unproblematic under the Rules of 
Professional Responsibility.  There are no state bar or ABA ethics opinions 
questioning the permissibility of such provisions.  Nor is there any such 
case law.  This is not surprising.  A participation threshold is simply a 
 
 11. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-371 (1993) 
(emphasis added) (regarding restrictions on the right to represent clients in the future). 
 12. Possible answers to the fascinating question of why the Rules interfere in this way 
are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 13. See, e.g., AMS Settlement, supra note 8, at 11. 
 14. The “walk-away” provisions of the Vioxx settlement agreement were yet another 
variant of this form.  See Vioxx Settlement, supra note 7, §§ 11.1–.4, 12.1.1–.1.6.  The 
Vioxx agreement imposed separate participation requirements on various subgroups of 
claimants, but each subgroup was required to meet the same 85 percent participation 
requirement. See id. § 11.1.1–.1.4.  In addition, the Vioxx agreement provided a walk-away 
right to the defendant if certain attorneys did not recommend that their clients participate in 
the nationwide settlement program established by the settlement agreement and did not 
otherwise comply with particular sections of the agreement. See id. § 11.1.5.  Distinguishing 
among particular plaintiffs’ counsel in this way is of potential interest to the defendant (and 
logically possible) only in an agreement establishing a nationwide settlement program rather 
than an agreement to settle only the “inventory” of a particular law firm. 
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bargaining point between the defendant and plaintiffs’ counsel, much like 
the total dollar amount of the settlement or any other material term of the 
settlement agreement.  A participation threshold in a master settlement 
agreement is ultimately no different from a defendant telling plaintiffs’ 
counsel that if the latter can provide signed releases from X percent or X 
number of claimants on the attached list that it will then agree to a 
settlement of those claims for no less than $Y (or for a total amount of $Z 
per such release tendered).  That is, a defendant could simply decline to 
enter into a formal agreement to settle any of the plaintiffs’ counsel’s claims 
until the plaintiffs’ counsel took a “straw poll” of sorts and could provide 
the defendant appropriate proof that a specified number of claimants would 
agree to settle for a total, specified sum. 
Nonetheless, as participation thresholds approach 100 percent, they are 
increasingly controversial and are considered ethically problematic by some 
legal scholars.  Professor Howard Erichson, for example, contends that “all-
or-nothing” provisions “create both client-client and lawyer-client conflicts 
of interest” and thus violate Rule 1.7(a)(2)’s prohibition against certain 
representations, which present “a significant risk that the representation of 
one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s 
responsibilities to another client . . . or by a personal interest of the 
lawyer.”15  For Erichson, a client-client conflict is created by a 100 percent 
participation requirement insofar as the “decision of some clients to decline 
the settlement impairs the ability of other clients to get the deal done.”16  
The attorney-client conflict arises in two respects.  First, “the client-client 
conflict makes it extremely difficult for a lawyer to give unbiased counsel 
to a client who wishes to decline the offer” if the settlement agreement 
requires 100 percent participation.17  And a 100 percent participation 
 
 15. Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 KAN. L. REV. 
979, 1007 (2010) (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2009)).  Rule 1.7 specifies that such representations are permitted if all of the following 
conditions are met: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide 
competent and diligent representation to each affected client; (2) the representation 
is not prohibited by law; (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a 
claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same 
litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and (4) each affected client gives 
informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
  Erichson distinguishes “most-or-nothing” settlements with “walkaway clauses 
requiring 85, 90, or 95% participation” from “all-or-nothing” settlements, and contends that 
the former “raise far fewer ethical concerns than those that require unanimity.” Erichson, 
supra, at 1023–24. 
 16. Erichson, supra note 15, at 1008 (footnotes omitted).  Although Erichson is less 
troubled by the client-client and lawyer-client conflicts of interest in settlements with a 
participation requirement of less than 100 percent, he notes that even settlements that 
“include the safety valve of permitting some clients to decline their share of the settlement 
without spoiling the deal for the other clients and for their lawyer” present these conflicts of 
interest. Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1769, 1798 (2005). 
 17. Erichson, supra note 15, at 1008.  Assuming arguendo that this difficulty exists, it 
does not obviate the lawyer’s obligation under Rule 2.1 to “exercise independent 
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threshold “pit[s] the lawyer’s interest in closing the deal against the 
interests of any client[] who might wish to decline the settlement,” thereby 
“putting the lawyer’s fee at risk.”18 
None of Erichson’s concerns is persuasive.  To begin, the client-client 
conflict that he contends is created in its most extreme form by a 100 
percent participation threshold is both waivable and indeed must be waived 
for the group settlement to proceed.  It is arguably waivable under Rule 
1.7(b), which provides in relevant part that a concurrent conflict is 
permissible if “the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able 
to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client” 
and “each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.”19  
Even more relevant, however, is Rule 1.8(g).20  As Erichson notes, any 
participation threshold creates an “interdependence” or “collective 
conditionality” among claims.21  This means that the settlement is arguably 
an “aggregate settlement,” and therefore Rule 1.8(g) applies.22  As I have 
previously explained, Rule 1.8(g) 
usefully supplements Rule 1.7.  Rule 1.8(g) makes clear that aggregate 
settlements are ethically permissible and that the plaintiffs’ attorney may 
ethically participate in the “making” of such settlements . . . .  The Rule 
also provides some detail about the content of the disclosures necessary in 
order for the attorney to obtain a client’s informed consent to such a 
settlement.  Put differently, Rule 1.8(g) provides a safe harbor for 
attorneys concerned that an aggregate settlement creates a non-waivable 
conflict under Rule 1.7.  It does not impose any new requirements on an 
attorney beyond those imposed by the other rules, but rather charts a path 
 
professional judgment and render candid advice” to the client. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 2.1.  Erichson concedes that “[w]hen a settlement contains a walkaway clause 
that conditions the deal upon 85% or 90% participation, the conflict is relatively mild 
because of the safety valve that permits a number of clients to decline the settlement without 
blowing the deal for everyone else.” Erichson, supra note 15, at 1008.  Thus, Erichson’s 
primary concern is with what he terms “all-or-nothing” settlements. Id. at 980 (“All-or-
nothing settlements . . . cause a lot of mischief.”). 
 18. Erichson, supra note 15, at 1009.  Erichson acknowledges that this attorney-client 
conflict exists even in settlements with participation thresholds of less than 100 percent. 
Erichson, supra note 16, at 1798 (“A settlement with a walk-away provision set at ninety-
nine percent, for example, functions almost identically to an all-or-nothing settlement in that 
the lawyer has a strong self-interest in ensuring that virtually every client accepts the deal, 
and clients who favor the settlement are pitted against those who do not.”). 
 19. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(1), (b)(4). 
 20. Rule 1.8(g) states in relevant part that a 
lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an 
aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients . . . unless each client 
gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client.  The lawyer’s disclosure 
shall include the existence and nature of all the claims . . . involved and of the 
participation of each person in the settlement. 
Id. r. 1.8(g). 
 21. Erichson, supra note 15, at 1008 (“Client-client conflicts occur whenever a deal is 
conditioned on terms that make clients’ settlements interdependent.”). 
 22. Id. at 1008 n.172 (citing, among other sources, Erichson, supra note 16, at 1796–99). 
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by which the plaintiffs’ attorney can provide clients the benefits of a non-
class-action group settlement without running afoul of Rule 1.7.23 
Thus, any client-client conflict created by a participation threshold does not 
render the participation threshold itself unethical or unenforceable, even if 
100 percent participation is required.  Rather, the resulting conflict is 
waivable, and will be waived by settling clients, pursuant to the disclosure 
and consent requirements of Rule 1.8(g). 
The attorney-client conflicts that Erichson contends result in their most 
extreme form from a 100 percent participation threshold also do not make 
the threshold unethical.  As with the client-client conflicts, these conflicts 
too are waivable under Rule 1.7(b) and will be waived by settling clients 
pursuant to the disclosure and consent requirements of Rule 1.8(g).  In 
addition, Erichson’s concerns with the impact of a 100 percent participation 
threshold on the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees have things exactly backward.  
Erichson is correct that any participation threshold (like any other 
obligation in the settlement agreement) puts the plaintiffs’ lawyer’s fee at 
risk:  if the threshold isn’t met, there may be no settlement and, therefore, 
no fee for the contingent fee plaintiffs’ attorney.24  Erichson correctly 
concedes that “[a]rguably, a lawyer-client conflict exists whenever a 
contingent fee lawyer advises a single client about a settlement because the 
lawyer’s fee may depend on the client’s decision” and “that level of conflict 
is inherent in virtually every [contingent fee] lawyer-client relationship.”25  
Where he errs is in his conclusion that the attorney’s risk of losing the fee is 
greater in the aggregate settlement context than in the single-client 
representation.26  To be sure, the total fee involved will typically be much 
greater in the aggregate settlement.27  But the likelihood that the attorney 
receives no fee is significantly greater in the single-client representation. 
In the single-client representation, there will be no settlement and 
therefore no fee for the contingent fee attorney if the client declines the 
settlement offer.28  In the aggregate settlement context, however, the 
decision of any one client to decline the settlement offer will not derail the 
settlement, even if the settlement agreement gives the defendant the option 
 
 23. Lynn A. Baker, Aggregate Settlements and Attorney Liability:  The Evolving 
Landscape, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 291, 317–18 (2015) (footnotes omitted).  Comment 13 
(“Aggregate Settlements”) to Rule 1.8 is consistent with my analysis. See MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 13. 
[Rule 1.8(g)] is a corollary of [Rules 1.7 and 1.2(a)] and provides that, before any 
settlement offer . . . is made or accepted on behalf of multiple clients, the lawyer 
must inform each of them about all the material terms of the settlement, including 
what the other clients will receive . . . if the settlement . . . is accepted. 
Id. 
 24. See Erichson, supra note 15, at 1009. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id. at 1009–10. (“What makes the all-or-nothing settlement troubling is the 
extent to which it ups the ante on the lawyer-client conflict by making the entire deal, and 
potentially the lawyer’s entire fee, subject to the decision of each individual client.”). 
 27. See id. at 1009. 
 28. Rule 1.2(a) is clear that “[a] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to 
settle a matter.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2. 
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to terminate the settlement if 100 percent of the eligible clients do not 
accept their settlement offers.  Consider a hypothetical settlement involving 
1,000 claimants and a 100 percent participation threshold.  If the plaintiffs’ 
attorney is able to obtain releases from “only” 999 of the claimants, will a 
self-interested defendant’s best course of action really be to terminate the 
settlement and continue litigating against the 1,000 claimants rather than 
have prompt, final resolution of the claims of the 999 claimants willing to 
settle?  In my nearly two decades of experience as a consultant on dozens of 
actual large-group, large-dollar, mass tort settlements, I have never seen a 
defendant terminate a settlement in which the specified participation 
threshold, whether 100 percent or less, was not met. 
If defendants do not enforce these participation thresholds, one might 
wonder why they are keen to include them in aggregate settlement 
agreements.  The answer is presumably that these provisions impose a kind 
of “best efforts” obligation on plaintiffs’ counsel to maximize the 
participation of their clients in the settlement.  The thresholds do afford the 
defendant the opportunity to ask the plaintiffs’ counsel hard questions about 
which clients are declining their settlement offers and why.  And the 
defendant does have the option to terminate the settlement if it is ultimately 
uncomfortable with the number or injury categories of the claimants 
declining their settlement offers or the reasons reported by the plaintiffs’ 
counsel for those claimants’ failure to participate in the settlement. 
In any event, the fact that defendants regularly waive their contractual 
right to terminate aggregate settlements in which the participation threshold 
is not met means that Erichson’s concern is misplaced:  the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers do not “stand[] to lose millions of dollars if any client says no.”29  
These lawyers will typically simply make a bit less in fees if 999 claimants, 
rather than 1,000, accept their settlement offers under the aggregate 
agreement.30  Rather, it is the lawyer representing a single client who risks 
making nothing and whose entire fee depends on a lone client’s willingness 
to accept the settlement offer.31 
Finally, it is important to appreciate that in deciding whether to accept a 
settlement offer the client in an aggregate settlement is in a very different 
position than a client in a non-mass tort, single-client representation.32  For 
 
 29. Erichson, supra note 15, at 1009. 
 30. Most aggregate settlement agreements, even those that specify a 100 percent 
participation requirement, also stipulate the portion of the total settlement fund to be rebated 
to the defendant in the event that the participation threshold is not met but the defendant 
nonetheless proceeds with the settlement. See, e.g., AMS Settlement, supra note 8, at 11 
(providing that if the distribution threshold is not met by the specified date, the defendant has 
the option to either void the entire agreement or receive “the return of the Individual 
Allocated Amount . . . for only those Claimants below the ninety-five percent (95%) 
Distribution Threshold”). 
 31. Cf. supra note 26 (“What makes the all-or-nothing settlement troubling is the extent 
to which it ups the ante on the lawyer-client conflict by making the entire deal, and 
potentially the lawyer’s entire fee, subject to the decision of each individual client.”). 
 32. I am assuming that the single-client representation involves a type of case that is 
typically free standing and litigated on its own, unlike a mass tort case, which may be one of 
hundreds or thousands of claims arising from the same event or allegedly defective product.  
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each of these clients, the issue is one of realistic alternatives.  In a non-mass 
tort, single-client representation, the client will often have more bargaining 
power with the defendant.  If the client does not settle, the case continues in 
the court system.  Depending on the extent of science and medical expertise 
required to try the client’s case, going to trial may not cost the plaintiff (and 
his or her counsel) much relative to the potential recovery.  As a one-off 
case, it may be highly cost effective for the defendant to reach an 
expeditious settlement.  Thus, the client’s decision to decline a settlement 
offer does not disadvantage the client in any way relative to his or her 
position if the defendant had not made the offer to settle. 
In contrast, a client who is considering declining a settlement offer made 
as part of an aggregate settlement may face only unattractive options.  As 
one among hundreds or thousands, the client will have little bargaining 
power with the defendant.  Assuming the aggregate settlement goes 
forward, the defendant will have resolved virtually all the pending cases, 
and the attendant cloud on its share price (if a publicly traded company) 
will have lifted.33  The defendant will not be overly concerned with the 
outlier nonsettling claimant.  If that claimant hopes to go to trial, any trial 
date may be years off and the anticipated cost of litigating his or her 
science- or medicine-intensive case may exceed $250,000.  Even a claimant 
with a strong claim may have difficulty finding a contingent fee lawyer 
eager to gamble that much money and time on the client’s case.34  In 
addition, the judge in any future trial may be especially unenthusiastic 
about trying the case.  The judge may want to know why the claimant was 
unsatisfied with a settlement that so many others found acceptable.  In sum, 
the unattractiveness of the various options available to the client who 
chooses to decline an offer under an aggregate settlement may result in 
relatively few such clients declining their offers.  And this in turn increases 
the likelihood that even a very high participation threshold will be met. 
B.  Plaintiffs’ Attorney Will Recommend Participation 
in the Settlement to All Clients 
A second provision one would find in the optimally comprehensive 
settlement agreement is an affirmation that the signatory plaintiffs’ counsel 
will be recommending participation in the settlement to all the covered 
clients.  In many confidential inventory settlement agreements, this 
provision states that “Claimants Counsel . . . have reviewed the provisions 
of this Agreement, have concluded that it is in the best interests of the 
Claimants” and therefore “warrant that they will recommend to each of the 
Claimants that they settle their [claims] under the terms of this 
 
Litigating the mass tort case will typically involve a great deal of scientific or medical 
expertise and the testimony of numerous expensive experts. 
 33. See, e.g., Berenson, Analysts, supra note 1. 
 34. The claimant’s original lawyer may have no difficulty obtaining judicial permission 
to withdraw from the client’s case if the claimant declines the settlement offer. See infra Part 
II.E. 
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Agreement.”35  In the public Vioxx settlement agreement, the language was 
essentially the same but took into account the more complex procedures of 
that nationwide settlement:  “By submitting an Enrollment Form, the 
Enrolling Counsel affirms that he has recommended, or . . . will 
recommend . . . to 100% of the Eligible Claimants represented by such 
Enrolling Counsel that such Eligible Claimants enroll in the Program.”36 
This provision in the Vioxx settlement agreement has been criticized as 
ethically problematic by legal scholars as well as by one state bar ethics 
committee.37  Most criticisms have focused on a perceived tension with 
Rule 2.1, which states:  “In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise 
independent professional judgment and render candid advice.”38  Many of 
these criticisms, however, are based on an incomplete understanding of the 
Vioxx settlement agreement, a misunderstanding of the provision itself, or 
both.  And the remaining criticisms are not persuasive. 
To begin, consider a hypothetical offer by a defendant to settle a 
plaintiffs’ lawyer’s entire group of 1,000 cases pursuant to an agreement 
that specifies the individual settlement offer values in a matrix.  Imagine 
that the defendant offers this to the plaintiffs’ lawyer as a take-it-or-leave-it 
deal and includes a provision that the plaintiffs’ lawyer must recommend 
the settlement to all her clients.  The plaintiffs’ lawyer finds the matrix 
values fair, with the exception of one category, involving two claimants, 
which the lawyer believes is undervalued by approximately $30,000 per 
claimant.  Despite the plaintiffs’ lawyer’s continued negotiation efforts, the 
defendant is not willing to change those or any other of the matrix values.  
Imagine further that to try any of the 1,000 cases would cost the plaintiffs’ 
lawyer approximately $250,000 and that, even if victorious at trial, the two 
claimants in question are highly unlikely to net more for their claim than the 
amount they would net—with certainty and much sooner—under the 
imperfect proposed settlement agreement. 
Under this hypothetical scenario, the plaintiffs’ lawyer would, in theory, 
be free to decline the settlement offer.  But one would expect the plaintiffs’ 
lawyer to agree to the proposed settlement notwithstanding her view that it 
undervalues the claims of two of her clients.  One would also expect the 
plaintiffs’ lawyer to tell those two clients that she wishes they were being 
offered more under the settlement matrix, that she tried to get them more, 
but that the defendant was unyielding, and that she nonetheless 
recommends that they accept their settlement offer given the alternatives.  
Critically, the plaintiffs’ lawyer would explain to the two clients that 
continuing to prosecute their case in the court system would certainly 
involve additional expense and delay, with no assurance of a better net 
outcome than the present settlement offer and some possibility of a worse 
outcome.  In addition, the plaintiffs’ lawyer would detail for the clients the 
 
 35. See, e.g., AMS Settlement, supra note 8, at 6. 
 36. Vioxx Settlement, supra note 7, § 1.2.8.1. 
 37. See generally Conn. Bar Ass’n, Informal Op. 08-01 (2008); Erichson & Zipursky, 
supra note 2. 
 38. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
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risks and economics of any eventual trial, all of which, upon careful 
consideration, have caused the lawyer to conclude that accepting the 
current, flawed settlement offer is still each client’s best option. 
The Vioxx settlement agreement offered each plaintiffs’ lawyer a choice 
very similar to that faced by the plaintiffs’ lawyer in the preceding 
hypothetical.  It was left to each plaintiffs’ lawyer to decide whether she 
could in good faith recommend participation in the nationwide Vioxx 
settlement program to each of her clients.  A plaintiffs’ lawyer who felt that 
she could not recommend participation to all her clients was free to reject 
the settlement offer and to not enroll her clients in the settlement.39  Thus, a 
plaintiffs’ lawyer who did agree to the settlement, and who was therefore 
committing to recommend that each of her clients participate in the 
settlement, had no reason to run afoul of Rule 2.1.  Prior to agreeing to the 
settlement, that lawyer would have already determined that an exercise of 
independent professional judgment on behalf of each of her clients would 
enable her to recommend that they each participate in the settlement.  The 
key question here is, “As compared to what?”  A lawyer who agreed to the 
settlement need only be of the view that for each of her clients, participation 
in the settlement is (reasonably likely) to be as good as any of the available 
alternatives.  The lawyer need not believe that the settlement will be the 
best possible settlement for each of her clients to be able to recommend in 
good faith that each client participate.  The lawyer is free to, and would be 
expected to, give each individual client “candid advice” regarding the 
settlement,40 as well to explain the settlement to each client “to the extent 
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions 
regarding the representation.”41  The fact that the lawyer’s bottom-line 
recommendation to each client is the same—to participate in the 
settlement—does not mean that the lawyer did not “exercise independent 
professional judgment” on behalf of each client in deciding whether she 
could in fact recommend the settlement to each of them.42 
When the Connecticut Bar Association’s Committee on Professional 
Ethics (“the Connecticut Committee”) took up the provision in the Vioxx 
settlement agreement, it began by describing the provision as one that 
“compels plaintiffs’ counsel to give the same advice to all of her clients.”43  
The provision does indeed require that the plaintiffs’ attorney give the same 
bottom-line recommendation to each client:  that the client participate in the 
 
 39. Because the Vioxx settlement agreement was public, however, potentially eligible 
claimants would necessarily know about it and could simply fire their lawyer and participate 
in the settlement pro se. See Vioxx Settlement, supra note 7, § 1.6.  In addition, even a 
lawyer who declined the offer would seemingly still be obligated to inform her clients about 
the settlement, pursuant to her communication obligations under Rule 1.4. See MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 cmt. 2 (noting that “a lawyer who receives from opposing counsel 
an offer of settlement in a civil controversy . . . must promptly inform the client of its 
substance”). 
 40. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1. 
 41. Id. r. 1.4(b). 
 42. Id. r. 2.1. 
 43. Conn. Bar Ass’n, Informal Op. 08-01, at 1 (2008) (discussing obligations of 
plaintiffs’ counsel under a particular aggregate settlement agreement). 
2017] MASS TORTS AND ETHICAL FINALITY 1955 
settlement.44  But it does not preclude the attorney from providing each 
client “candid advice” regarding the settlement.  Such candid advice might 
include setting out the advantages and disadvantages of an individual 
client’s participation relative to the alternatives or even stating that the 
lawyer does not think the settlement matrix treats a particular client fairly 
but that participation in the settlement is nonetheless the client’s best path 
in the foreseeable future to receiving reasonable compensation for his or her 
claims. 
The Connecticut Committee contended that “the agreement restricts the 
advice [the lawyer] can give:  either recommend that all clients accept the 
settlement or that none of them accept it.”45  This seems to envision that all 
plaintiffs’ attorneys must participate in the settlement and then comply with 
each of its requirements including the “universal recommendation” 
provision.  But this is not what the Vioxx settlement agreement requires or 
how it operates.  As in the hypothetical above, a plaintiffs’ attorney must 
first decide if she can agree to the settlement at all.  Given the universal 
recommendation provision, the attorney must first determine whether she 
can recommend the settlement to each of her clients based on an exercise of 
her independent professional judgment with regard to each client.46  An 
attorney who does not believe that she can comply with this (or any other) 
provision of the settlement will simply not agree to the settlement, and, in 
that event, the settlement agreement will not in any way “restrict the advice 
she can give” her clients.  In sum, the provision does not improperly restrict 
the advice the attorney can give her clients; it simply imposes a condition 
on the attorney’s acceptance of the settlement. 
 
 44. See Vioxx Settlement, supra note 7, § 1.2.7. 
 45. Conn. Bar Ass’n, Informal Op. 08-01, at 3. 
 46. The unusual structure of the Vioxx settlement and the length of the settlement 
agreement may have resulted in an unusually large number of plaintiffs’ attorneys—and the 
Connecticut Committee—not fully understanding what the settlement agreement required of 
plaintiffs’ attorneys.  Thus, on January 17, 2008, some two months after the November 9, 
2007 settlement agreement was signed and one month before the Connecticut Committee 
issued its February 20, 2008 informal opinion, the defendant (Merck) and the negotiating 
plaintiffs’ counsel executed an “Amendment to Settlement Agreement.” Amendment to 
Settlement Agreement, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05-md-1657 (E.D. La. Jan. 17, 
2008), http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents/Amendments%20to%20Master% 
20Settlement%20Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RWX-FRWN].  The purpose of the 
amendment was to “make certain technical and clarifying amendments to the Settlement 
Agreement . . . to ensure that the document accurately and clearly reflects the Parties’ 
original intent.” Id. Recital C.  Section 1.2.2 of the amendment undertook to clarify the 
universal recommendation provision of the settlement agreement (section 1.2.8.1) by 
restating it as follows: 
Each Enrolling Counsel is expected to exercise his or her independent judgment in 
the best interest of each client individually before determining whether to 
recommend enrollment in the Program.  By submitting an Enrollment Form, the 
Enrolling Counsel affirms that he or she has exercised such independent judgment 
and either (1) has recommended to 100% of the Eligible Claimants represented by 
such Enrolling Counsel that such Eligible Claimants enroll in the Program or 
(2) . . . will [make such a recommendation] by no later than February 28, 
2008 . . . . 
Id. § 1.2.2. 
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Professors Howard Erichson and Benjamin Zipursky also found the 
universal recommendation provision troubling.47  They acknowledged, “In 
theory, a lawyer could determine that the overall settlement and its 
allocation process are satisfactory for all Vioxx claimants and, on that basis, 
sincerely recommend the settlement to each of her clients.”48  Indeed, this is 
a fully accurate statement of how, I believe, the parties to the Vioxx 
settlement agreement imagined the thought process of a plaintiffs’ attorney 
when considering whether to participate in the settlement.  Erichson and 
Zipursky are nonetheless troubled by the provision: 
In practice, however, one wonders how a lawyer would handle clients 
whose claims may be undervalued by the point-allocation system, or 
whose claims would provoke unusually strong jury sympathy, or who 
would make uncommonly strong witnesses, or who have high risk 
tolerance, or who place significant value on the right to go to trial, or who 
for any other reason might be well advised to decline the settlement.49 
There are two obvious responses to Erichson and Zipursky’s concerns.  
First, by their own (correct) account of the universal recommendation 
provision, a lawyer need only “determine that the overall settlement and its 
allocation process are satisfactory” and not that each client’s settlement 
offer under the agreement is ideal.50  Thus, the lawyer might consider a 
particular claimant’s settlement offer to be suboptimal because she believes 
the claim is undervalued by the point-allocation system or for any other 
reason, yet the lawyer might still conclude that, all things considered, the 
offer is “satisfactory” and recommend that the client accept it. 
Second, the lawyer’s assessment of whether a particular client’s 
settlement offer is satisfactory is necessarily a relative judgment, which 
must take into account not only the gross dollar amount of the offer but also 
the absence of risk, speed of payment, and litigation expenses to be 
deducted from that offer relative to either a later potential settlement or 
trial.  In the context of the Vioxx settlement, for example, it merits 
particular note that any eventual trial would involve significant medical and 
scientific expertise and could be expected to cost $250,000 or more.  Some 
or all of these litigation expenses would be deducted from the client’s share 
of any eventual recovery (assuming a verdict in favor of the plaintiff 
survived all appeals).  Thus, any future recovery would need to be both 
significantly larger than the offer under the settlement agreement (and have 
a very high likelihood of being obtained) for the client eventually to net 
more than would be the case under the settlement agreement. 
 
 47. Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 283 & n.74.  It should be noted that only the 
Liptak article of the sources cited postdates the January 2008 clarifying amendment.  For 
other criticisms of this provision of the settlement, see Erichson, supra note 15, at 1000–04. 
 48. Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 284 (emphasis added).  Erichson and Zipursky 
are importantly correct in positing a standard of “satisfactory” rather than, say, “best 
possible” for the plaintiffs’ attorney’s evaluation of the settlement and therefore whether she 
can recommend it to each of her clients. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Moreover, a client’s risk of obtaining no recovery at all can be 
significant.  In the Vioxx settlement, for example, the template cover letter 
for attorneys who agreed to the settlement to provide their clients when 
explaining and recommending the settlement included sobering information 
about the very mixed results of the sixteen trials to that date and about a 
then-pending U.S. Supreme Court case that could “limit the ability of 
plaintiffs to recover against drug companies if a drug has been approved for 
marketing by the FDA.”51  In addition, one wonders about the likelihood 
that a court would be willing to try the case of a plaintiff who opted out of 
the nationwide settlement program, or the likelihood that the defendant 
would be willing to provide a more generous settlement offer to such an 
opt-out client, given the comprehensiveness of the nationwide settlement 
program and the fact that it was crafted with the implicit consent of the four 
judges in whose courts more than 95 percent of the active plaintiffs’ cases 
were coordinated.52 
C.  Plaintiffs’ Attorney Will Not Represent 
Any New Clients with Similar Claims 
A third provision one might expect to be included in an optimally 
comprehensive settlement agreement is an affirmation by plaintiffs’ counsel 
 
 51. Client Cover Letter, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05-md-1657 (E.D. La. Nov. 
9, 2007), http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents/Client%20Cover%20Letter% 
20-%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/YF6D-L68K].  The template letter to clients stated: 
• To date, throughout the country, there have been 16 Vioxx trials involving 17 
plaintiffs.  Of these trials, plaintiffs have won 5, Merck has won 7, and the 
remaining 5 are awaiting a new trial.  Merck has appealed each of the five cases in 
which the plaintiff was victorious, and all of those appeals are still pending. 
• To date, not even the five plaintiffs with hard fought victories against Merck at 
trial have received any money from Merck.  The first verdict in favor of a plaintiff 
was in August 2005, more than two years ago.  Merck has not yet paid a single 
dollar of that verdict and has no legal obligation to do so unless and until all 
appeals are exhausted and the verdict in favor of the plaintiff is upheld. 
Id. 
 52. The Vioxx settlement agreement stated that Merck was confronting approximately 
47,000 filed claims nationwide, along with approximately 13,250 claims on tolling 
agreements.  Vioxx Settlement, supra note 7, Recital B.  It then listed the four “Coordinated 
Proceedings” in which “[m]ore than 95% of the active plaintiffs are presently coordinated”:  
the federal multidistrict litigation (MDL No. 1657), venued in the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana (Judge Eldon E. Fallon); the California proceedings (JCCP No. 
4247), venued in the Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County (Judge Victoria G. 
Chaney); the New Jersey proceedings (Case Nos. 619 and 273), venued in the Superior 
Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County (Judge Carol E. Higbee); and the Texas 
proceedings (No. 2005-59599), venued in the District Court of Harris County, Texas (Judge 
Randy Wilson). Id. Recital D. 
  Each of these four judges issued an order staying proceedings in their respective 
courts in light of the nationwide resolution program, and each subsequently issued an order 
requiring the registration of claims, consistent with the settlement agreement. See Vioxx 
Settlement Documents, OFFICIAL VIOXX SETTLEMENT, http://www.officialvioxx 
settlement.com/documents/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/KZ2C-EAHX].  In 
addition, Judge Fallon “agreed to preside over the [settlement] Program” and serve as its 
“Chief Administrator.” Vioxx Settlement, supra note 7, § 6.1.1.  Each of the three state court 
judges had an explicit role to play regarding the eventual allocation of the “Settlement Fee 
and Cost Account.” Id. § 9.2.3. 
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that they will not represent new clients for the purpose of bringing similar 
claims against the defendant.  Such a provision, however, clearly runs afoul 
of the plain language of Rule 5.6, which states in relevant part that “a 
lawyer shall not participate in offering or making . . . an agreement in which 
a restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is part of the settlement of a 
client controversy.”53  Comment 2 elaborates that this provision “prohibits a 
lawyer from agreeing not to represent other persons in connection with 
settling a claim on behalf of a client.”54 
Prior to 1970, such provisions were unproblematic under the equivalent 
to current Rule 5.6.55  Since the adoption of the Rule’s current wording, 
courts and scholars have continued to debate the actual and appropriate 
scope of the Rule’s prohibition and the justifications for it.56  The leading 
ABA formal ethics opinion regarding the Rule explicitly acknowledges the 
premium that a defendant would pay plaintiffs and their counsel for such a 
provision57 but concludes Rule 5.6(b) mandates that “a lawyer cannot agree 
to refrain from representing present or future clients against a defendant 
pursuant to a settlement agreement on behalf of current clients even in the 
mass tort, global settlement context.”58  In a 1993 ethics opinion, the ABA 
stated that the policy justification for the Rule “is clear,” and the ABA 
reaffirmed those policy concerns in a 2000 opinion59: 
First, permitting such agreements restricts the access of the public to 
lawyers who, by virtue of their background and experience, might be the 
very best available talent to represent these individuals.  Second, the use 
of such agreements may provide clients with rewards that bear less 
relationship to the merits of their claims than they do to the desire of the 
defendant to “buy off” plaintiff’s counsel.  Third, the offering of such 
 
 53. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 54. Id. r. 5.6 cmt. 2. 
 55. See Stephen Gillers & Richard W. Painter, Free the Lawyers:  A Proposal to Permit 
No-Sue Promises in Settlement Agreements, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 295–97 (2005) 
(detailing the historical evolution of current Rule 5.6). 
 56. See Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 285 (“To be sure, Rule 5.6(b) is itself 
controversial.”); Gillers & Painter, supra note 55, at 296–302; David Luban, Settlements and 
the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2624 (1995) (“The ban on lawyer 
buyout is virtually the only piece of the ethics codes that recognizes that accumulated legal 
skills are a public good that should not be squandered on a single favorable settlement.”); see 
also Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 338, 341–46 (E.D.N.Y. 
1999) (expressing doubt about rationale for the prohibition of no-sue agreements, at least 
where there is “no threat to the public’s unfettered right to counsel”); Feldman v. Minars, 
658 N.Y.S.2d 614, 617 (App. Div. 1997) (holding that “an agreement by counsel not to 
represent similar plaintiffs in similar actions against a contracting party is not against the 
public policy of the State of New York”); Stephen Gillers, A Rule Without a Reason:  Let the 
Market, Not the Bar, Regulate Settlements That Restrict Practice, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 
118. 
 57. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-371, at 2 (1993) 
(acknowledging “the fact that the defendant is willing to offer more consideration than it 
might otherwise offer in order to secure the covenant from the attorney not to represent other 
present clients as well as future claimants”). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id.; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 00-
417 (2000) (discussing settlement terms limiting a lawyer’s use of information). 
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restrictive agreements places the plaintiff’s lawyer in a situation where 
there is conflict between the interests of present clients and those of 
potential future clients.  While the Model Rules generally require that the 
client’s interests be put first, forcing a lawyer to give up future 
representations may be asking too much, particularly in light of the strong 
countervailing policy favoring the public’s unfettered choice of counsel.60 
These policy arguments for the Rule continue to be controversial.61 
Given the obvious benefits to both sides of including so-called “no sue” 
provisions in certain settlement agreements, defendants and plaintiffs’ 
lawyers have long sought to work around the restrictions imposed by Rule 
5.6(b).  One approach has been for a defendant, moments after executing a 
settlement agreement with a plaintiffs’ lawyer to resolve her clients’ claims, 
to enter into a consulting agreement with that lawyer.62  In this way, the 
defendant becomes the lawyer’s new client and conflict rules will prevent 
the lawyer from bringing similar, future claims against the defendant.63  
Numerous courts and state bar associations, however, have condemned such 
agreements and have imposed sanctions including disbarment, suspensions, 
and significant monetary penalties on the attorneys on both sides.64 
Perhaps the most popular approach in recent years has been the use in 
settlement agreement of “no present intention” language along the 
following lines: 
While nothing in the . . . Agreement is intended to operate as a restriction 
on the right of the Claimants Counsel to practice law within the meaning 
of Rule 5.6(b) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct . . . the 
Claimants Counsel represent that they have no present intent to solicit or 
represent new clients for the purpose of bringing [similar] Claims.65 
A statement that the claimants’ law firm “has no present intent” to do 
something is importantly different, as a legal matter, from an agreement or 
promise by the firm not to do something in the future.  To date, two courts 
have explicitly found such language in settlement agreements ethically 
unproblematic on the ground that an affirmation of “no present intention” to 
do something is not “an agreement but merely an attempt by one 
negotiating party to achieve finality through the settlement.”66  Although 
 
 60. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-371, at 2; see also 
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 00-417. 
 61. See, e.g., Gillers & Painter, supra note 55, at 307–19 (presenting arguments for 
prohibiting no-sue agreements and responses to them). 
 62. See id. at 309–10. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See, e.g., Adams v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., No. 96-2473-CIV, 2001 WL 
34032759 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2001); In re Hager, 812 A.2d 904 (D.C. App. 2002); Fla. Bar v. 
St. Louis, 967 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 2007); In re Brandt, 10 P.3d 906 (Or. 2000). 
 65. See AMS Settlement, supra note 8, at 20 (emphasis added). 
 66. Desantis v. Snap-On Tools Co., No. 06-cv-2231 (DMC), 2006 WL 3068584, at *12 
(D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2006) (emphasis added) (holding also that a provision of a settlement 
agreement stating that counsel “had no present intention of representing any persons who are 
not Class Members with respect to defendants” and “does not restrict [counsel’s] right to 
represent any future clients”); La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Black, No. 9410-VCN, 
2016 WL 790898, at *5 & n.37 (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 2016) (citing Desantis approvingly and 
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unsurprising, these holdings raise the question of why a defendant cares to 
include such language in the settlement agreement if it has no legal force.  
One possibility is that Wall Street might (mis)interpret the language to 
impose a legally enforceable limit on the defendant’s potential liability, 
thereby benefitting the company’s share price.  Another possibility is that 
the language has actual in terrorem force in the small world of repeat 
players among both defense counsel (and their clients) and plaintiffs’ 
counsel.67  Whatever the reasons, such language is increasingly common in 
settlement agreements.  And if the de facto effect of such language is 
identical to the prohibited language, one wonders if the “finality premium” 
paid by defendants for the “no present intention” language is comparable.  
That is, perhaps Rule 5.6(b) results in a subsidy of sorts to defendants if the 
“no present intention” language, which is the best one can do under the 
current rules, reduces the premium they must pay the plaintiffs (and their 
counsel) for finality comparable to what might be achieved with the 
prohibited language. 
D.  Plaintiffs’ Attorney Will Not Advertise 
for New Clients with Similar Claims 
A related provision one might expect to find in an optimally 
comprehensive settlement agreement is an affirmation by the plaintiffs’ 
counsel that they will take down and cease all advertising in any and all 
media for new clients with similar claims against the defendant.  Whether 
such a provision runs afoul of Rule 5.6(b) will depend on whether 
advertising by plaintiffs’ lawyers is considered part of the practice of law 
such that a restriction on advertising for certain new clients is considered an 
impermissible “restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice.”68 
The state bar ethics committees of Texas and South Carolina have held 
that advertising and solicitation are “protected under the umbrella of ‘a 
lawyer’s right to practice law.’”69  In 1995, the Texas Bar Professional 
Ethics Committee held: 
Solicitation generally describes conduct by an attorney or a third person 
acting for an attorney, which specifically targets potential clients, with the 
intent of pecuniary gain.  To the extent that such is permitted under the 
State Bar Rules, and other applicable state and federal statutes, solicitation 
 
distinguishing as a violation of Rule 5.6(b) a straightforward promise by plaintiffs’ counsel 
not to initiate litigation against the defendant in the future, “because it involves a prospective 
guarantee not to represent future clients, the violation of which would . . . terminate the 
deal”). 
 67. This is the answer I received in a May 2016 conversation with an attorney who has 
years of experience as outside counsel to defendants in various mass tort settlements. 
 68. Rule 5.6(b) states in relevant part that a “lawyer shall not participate in offering or 
making . . . an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is part of the 
settlement of a client controversy.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.6(b) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2016). 
 69. S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 10-04, (2010); Tex. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 
505 (1995); cf. Tex. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 590 (2009) (“The conclusion that solicitation 
of clients, to the extent permitted by applicable disciplinary rules and other law, is an 
appropriate part of the practice of law was affirmed in Opinion 505.”). 
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is part of the practice of law and therefore cannot be more severely 
restricted in a settlement agreement tha[n] it is restricted in the Rules and 
applicable law. 
 . . . . 
 A settlement agreement which exceeds current limitations placed on 
solicitation would be a limitation on the practice of law and therefore a 
violation of [the Texas equivalent to ABA Rule 5.6(b)].70 
In 2010, the South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Committee cited the 
1995 Texas ethics opinion in reaching the same conclusion that its “Rule 
5.6(b) precludes contracting away rights associated with the practice of law, 
among them the right to advertise one’s services.”71  In light of these 
decisions, defendants and plaintiffs’ lawyers have arrived at a work-around 
similar to that for the “no new client” restrictions discussed in the preceding 
section: 
[W]hile nothing in this Agreement is intended to operate as a “restriction” 
on the right of Claimants’ Counsel to practice law within the meaning of 
the [relevant state(s)’] equivalent to Rule 5.6(b) of the ABA Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct[,] . . . Claimants’ Counsel represents that 
Claimants’ Counsel has removed, dismantled, or discontinued, and has no 
present intention to create in the future, any advertisements for clients 
relating to [claims involving Product X].72 
The “no present intention” statement within this provision is permissible 
for the reasons discussed above.73  The statement that the claimants’ law 
firm “has removed, dismantled, or discontinued” all advertisements for 
clients with claims involving “Product X” is ethically unproblematic 
because it is simply a statement of fact regarding past actions voluntarily 
 
 70. Tex. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 505.  The question presented to the Texas 
Professional Ethics Committee was, “Would a violation of Texas Disciplinary Rules of 
Professional Conduct occur if a law firm agreed, as part of the settlement of a lawsuit, not to 
solicit third parties in the future to prosecute claims against the opposing party?” Id.  This is 
a broader, and therefore potentially more problematic, restriction than the one discussed in 
this Article.  In framing its discussion, however, the committee took a more narrow 
approach: 
Under [the Texas equivalent to ABA Rule 5.6(b)], the key issue is whether or not a 
settlement agreement such as this would in any way prevent a lawyer from 
representing another person.  Generally, it seems that the intent of [this] clause[] 
would be exactly that:  to limit an attorney from representing a client similarly 
situated in a matter against the opposing party. 
Id. 
 71. S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 10-04.  The “proposed limitation in this 
settlement” was that “Lawyer A, the lawyer for the plaintiff, agree that Lawyer A may not 
identify or use the defendant’s name for ‘commercial or commercially-related publicity 
purposes.’  Lawyer A may identify generally ‘a settlement was achieved against an 
industry’—i.e.:  trucking or retail store.” Id. 
  The South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Committee’s mention of Bates v. Arizona, 
433 U.S. 350 (1977), is both apt and ironic.  Prior to that U.S. Supreme Court decision, state 
bars routinely prohibited virtually all attorney advertising.  Thus, with the South Carolina 
and Texas ethics opinions, we have gone full circle, from attorney advertising essentially not 
being permitted to advertising become a constitutional right that the attorney cannot waive. 
 72. Confidential Master Settlement Agreement (emphasis added) (on file with author); 
cf, e.g., AMS Settlement, supra note 8, at 20. 
 73. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
1962 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
taken by the firm.  As with the “no present intention” language discussed in 
Part II.C, one is left to wonder why defendants are concerned to include 
language in the settlement agreement that has no legal force.  If the de facto 
effect of such language is the same as for the language prohibited by Rule 
5.6(b), one also wonders if the “finality premium” paid by defendants for 
the “no present intention” language is comparable. 
E.  Plaintiffs’ Attorney Will Undertake to Withdraw 
from Representing Clients Who Decline Their Settlement Offer 
A final provision one might expect to find in an optimally comprehensive 
settlement agreement is an affirmation by claimants’ counsel that they will 
take “all necessary steps to disengage and withdraw from the 
representation” of any claimant who declines his or her settlement offer.74  
The Vioxx settlement agreement included a variant of this provision, which 
was highly controversial.75  Some of the controversy seemed to result from 
misreading and mischaracterizing the provision as a “mandatory 
withdrawal” provision.76  The Vioxx provision explicitly included the 
obvious implicit constraint that this obligation of claimants’ counsel existed 
only “to the extent permitted by the equivalents to Rules 1.16 and 5.6 of the 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct in the relevant 
jurisdiction(s).”77  Rule 1.16 is doing the primary work here insofar as it 
limits the circumstances under which a lawyer may ethically seek to 
withdraw from representing a client and sets out the procedures the attorney 
must follow to do so.  To begin, Rule 1.16(c) requires a lawyer in a filed 
case to “comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a 
tribunal when terminating a representation” and it further obligates the 
lawyer to “continue representation notwithstanding good cause for 
terminating the representation” if “ordered to do so by a tribunal.”78  Thus, 
an attorney cannot simply unilaterally withdraw from a filed case. 
In addition, Rule 1.16(b) requires that the attorney have “good cause” for 
seeking to withdraw, and sets out various circumstances that would meet 
this requirement.  The two circumstances most likely to be relevant in a 
mass tort context, such as the Vioxx settlement, are when “the client insists 
upon taking action . . . with which the lawyer has a fundamental 
disagreement” and when “the representation will result in an unreasonable 
 
 74. See, e.g., Vioxx Settlement, supra note 7, § 1.2.8.2. 
 75. See id.  For concurrent commentary critical of this provision, see, e.g., Erichson & 
Zipursky, supra note 2, at 281 n.74 (citing sources); see also, e.g., Conn. Bar Ass’n, Informal 
Op. 08-01, at 1 (2008); Nancy J. Moore, Ethical Issues in Mass Tort Plaintiffs’ 
Representation:  Beyond the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3233 (2013). 
 76. Even commentators such as Erichson and Zipursky, who clearly appreciated the 
careful wording of the provision and its implications, repeatedly referred to the provision as 
the “mandatory-withdrawal provision” and stated that “participating lawyers were 
obligated . . . to withdraw from representing clients who refused the settlement.” Erichson & 
Zipursky, supra note 2, at 283.  “Mandatory” withdrawal is not even logically possible if a 
case has been filed, given the need for notice to the court and court approval. See MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 77. See Vioxx Settlement, supra note 7, § 1.2.8.2. 
 78. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(c). 
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financial burden on the lawyer.”79  Some scholars have argued that a 
qualifying “fundamental disagreement” does not exist when the lawyer 
fundamentally disagrees with the client’s decision to reject the settlement.80  
They contend that to hold otherwise would be to “assume the settlement 
decision belongs to the lawyer despite Rule 1.2(a)’s clear instruction that 
the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision whether to accept or reject a 
settlement.”81  There are two problems with this argument.  First, a lawyer 
who seeks permission from a court to withdraw from representing a client 
who has declined a settlement offer has not usurped the client’s decision 
whether to settle.  The client has chosen not to settle and the lawyer has not 
in any way overridden that decision.  Second, the mandate of Rule 1.2(a) 
that the lawyer “abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter”82 
does not require that the lawyer continue to represent a client who declines 
a settlement offer; rather, it requires that the lawyer not settle the client’s 
case without the client’s permission, and the lawyer seeking permission 
from the court to withdraw from representing the client has not done so. 
Scholars such as Erichson and Zipursky, who contend that the 
withdrawal provision of the Vioxx settlement agreement is ethically 
impermissible, note in further support of their position that “[c]ases 
overwhelmingly reject the idea that a lawyer may fire a client for declining 
a settlement against the lawyer’s advice.”83  The mass tort context, 
however, is distinguishable in several relevant respects:  (1) the attorney is 
working on a contingent fee and typically is advancing all litigation 
expenses on behalf of the client with no risk to the client; (2) the settlement 
offer which the client has chosen to decline may be the best net result the 
attorney reasonably believes he or she can obtain through settlement for the 
client in the foreseeable future; and (3) the expected value of the client’s 
case at trial, even with a favorable verdict, might be too low even to cover 
the cost of the trial. 
Put differently, in a mass tort context, such as the Vioxx settlement, 
continuing to represent a nonsettling claimant may well impose “an 
unreasonable financial burden” on the contingent fee claimant’s counsel, 
justifying withdrawal under Rule 1.16(b)(6).  Erichson and Zipursky 
acknowledge that “[c]ompared with the certainty of payout under Merck’s 
settlement program, plaintiffs’ lawyers might regard bringing a [Vioxx] 
case to trial as a highly questionable investment.”84  In their view, however, 
this is not a sufficient basis on which such attorneys can seek withdrawal, 
 
 79. Id. r. 1.16(b)(4), (b)(6).  Other provisions, including 1.16(b)(1) and 1.16(b)(7) might 
also be relevant in many circumstances. 
 80. See, e.g., Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 287. 
 81. Id.  Erichson is also concerned that a lawyer withdrawing if the client declines a 
settlement offer means that the client’s informed consent to settlement offer is meaningless:  
“they essentially had no real choice.” Erichson, supra note 15, at 1019.  The client does have 
the choice to find another lawyer, however.  And if the client cannot find another lawyer to 
take his case, it may mean the client is being unreasonable in declining the settlement offer. 
 82. MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a). 
 83. Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 287. 
 84. Id. at 289. 
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because “[t]he lawyers did not limit the scope of their representation to 
pursuing settlement,” a contractual limitation that they further acknowledge 
might not even be permissible under Rule 1.2(c).85  In sum, notwithstanding 
the plain language of Rule 1.16(b)(6), Erichson and Zipursky appear to 
contend that a contingent fee attorney is obligated to lose money on behalf 
of a client who declines a settlement offer and wants to pursue his or her 
case to trial.  The argument is not persuasive. 
A few further aspects of such withdrawal provisions merit discussion.  
First, insofar as “good cause” is a prerequisite under Rule 1.16 for an 
attorney to (seek permission to) withdraw from a client’s (filed) case, a 
claimant’s attorney is not obligated by a withdrawal provision to (seek the 
court’s permission to) withdraw if the attorney does not think good cause 
for withdrawal exists.  For example, an attorney might believe that a 
client’s settlement offer is not sufficiently large given the likelihood that the 
client would prevail at trial and the expected value of the client’s case net of 
the costs of trial.  In that event, the attorney might consider the client’s 
decision to decline the settlement offer to be entirely reasonable, and the 
attorney would therefore not think good cause for withdrawal exists.  
Second, even if the attorney does believe good cause exists, the court might 
deny the attorney’s motion to withdraw as counsel.  Thus, taking “all 
necessary steps to disengage and withdraw from the representation of a 
client” will not necessarily mean that the attorney will no longer represent 
the client. 
Finally, some critics of the Vioxx withdrawal provision have expressed 
particular skepticism regarding its caveat that lawyers should undertake to 
withdraw only “to the extent permitted by” Rules 1.16 and 5.6.86  Erichson 
and Zipursky, for example, argue that 
[i]f this language is taken seriously, . . . then neither the intent nor the 
terms of the [Vioxx] agreement required counsel to withdraw from 
representing clients who declined the settlement.  Obedience to Rules 
 
 85. Id.  Erichson and Zipursky contend: 
The problem with this argument is that when the lawyer agreed to represent each 
Vioxx claimant, the lawyer could not assume that Merck would offer a settlement, 
and even if it did, the lawyer could not assume that the client would accept the 
offer.  The lawyers did not limit the scope of their representation to pursuing 
settlement. 
Id.  With regard to the last point, they elaborate as follows: 
Under Rule 1.2(c), a lawyer “may limit the scope of the representation if the 
limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed 
consent. . . .  We doubt whether, under the circumstances of the Vioxx litigation, a 
lawyer could properly limit the scope of representation so that clients understood 
that the lawyer represented them solely for purposes of a possible settlement.  
Without the leverage of adjudication, a lawyer could not adequately pursue the 
interests of tort claimants.  In any event, such limited representation is not the 
scenario that the actual Vioxx case presents. 
Id. at 289 n.110. 
 86. Vioxx Settlement, supra note 7, § 1.2.8.2.  These critics include Erichson and 
Zipursky who contend, among other things, that “[t]o a great extent, these clauses are 
defensive verbiage, and the work they are actually supposed to do is unclear.” Erichson & 
Zipursky, supra note 2, at 290. 
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1.16 and 5.6 would compel plaintiffs’ counsel not to withdraw from 
representing their nonsettling clients.87 
As explained above, however, this is not a correct reading of Rule 1.16.  
If one reads Rule 1.16(b)(6) as I set out above, it is possible for plaintiffs’ 
counsel to believe that “good cause” to withdraw exists insofar as continued 
representation would impose an unreasonable financial burden on the 
lawyer but for the lawyer nonetheless to be willing to continue the 
representation.  That is, having good cause to withdraw does not require 
that one withdraw but makes it ethically permissible to do so.88  Thus, one 
way to make sense of the caveat language that Erichson and Zipursky find 
troubling is for the provision to require that a plaintiffs’ lawyer who does 
have good cause to withdraw, but who is not required by Rule 1.16(a) to 
withdraw, take appropriate steps to withdraw even if the lawyer might 
otherwise be willing to continue the representation.  Such an agreement 
seems to be ethically unproblematic and likely to result in more 
comprehensive closure under the settlement.  For a plaintiffs’ lawyer who 
does not believe that good cause exists to (request permission to) withdraw 
from a representation, the caveat language should indeed provide 
“contractual comfort.”89 
III.  COMPREHENSIVE FINALITY IN NONCLASS MASS TORTS:  
A DEFENSE AND A PROPOSAL 
Comprehensive finality in nonclass mass torts has clear benefits and no 
significant costs for the defendants, which translates into a “finality 
premium” for the plaintiffs.  The issue then becomes whether such 
comprehensive finality also has costs for the plaintiffs, which might exceed 
the benefits of that increased compensation.  Throughout the preceding 
analysis of five core components of comprehensive finality in nonclass 
mass tort settlements, the primary costs alleged by critics have been the 
adverse effect on the autonomy and choices available to present (and future) 
plaintiffs.90  The conceptions of client autonomy and choice that underlie 
many of these critiques, however, seem to be derived from a model of 
individual, hourly rate representation rather than a model of aggregate, 
contingent fee representation.  In addition, some of the claimed costs to the 
plaintiffs do not seem to be a function of the comprehensiveness of the 
settlement but rather of the underlying aggregation inherent in the mass 
action. 
 
 87. Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 290–91. 
 88. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“[A] lawyer 
may withdraw from representing a client if . . . good cause for withdrawal exists.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 89. See Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 2, at 291. 
 90. Similarly, the bad acts of various attorneys involved in nonclass aggregate 
settlements, discussed in Erichson, supra note 15, at 982–1006, reflect on those particular 
attorneys and not on aggregate settlements, their negotiation, or the existing ethics rules.  
Many attorneys who engage in bad acts are not involved in aggregate settlements, and most 
attorneys do not engage in bad acts. 
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In undertaking any normative assessment of the ethics rules that do and 
should govern nonclass mass tort settlements, it is critical to keep in mind 
that mass actions are importantly different from individual litigation.  This 
distinction is rarely acknowledged in the ethics rules, which embody a 
largely individualistic model of what lawyers do and who their clients are.91  
In mass litigation, in which a single plaintiffs’ law firm may represent a 
thousand claimants, whose cases it will move toward trial or settlement as a 
block, the individual plaintiff will typically and inevitably have less 
autonomy in certain respects than a plaintiff flying solo.  In exchange, 
however, the mass litigation claimants gain several important advantages by 
prosecuting their claims collectively.  These include increased leverage in 
settlement negotiations, economies of scale in litigation costs, equalization 
of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ financial risks, and conservation of 
defendants’ assets.92 
In sum, the choice of baseline matters.  The appropriate baseline against 
which to assess the five core components of comprehensive finality 
discussed in this Article is a nonclass aggregate settlement agreement, 
which is identical except for the finality provision(s) at issue.  When 
measured against that baseline, it seems clear that the benefits of 
comprehensive finality in nonclass mass tort settlements exceed the costs 
for plaintiffs as well as defendants. 
As the analysis in Part II has shown, three of the core components of 
comprehensive finality in mass tort settlement agreements are 
unproblematic under the existing ethics rules, notwithstanding the criticisms 
of various commentators.93  The remaining two components in their purest 
form are problematic under Rule 5.6(b), but the market has generated 
“work-arounds” through the use of “no present intention” language.94  
There is reason to expect, however, that these work-arounds may be costing 
the plaintiffs some portion of their potentially available finality premium 
and perhaps providing a windfall to the defendants.95 
I therefore, propose that Rule 5.6(b) be amended to read (in relevant part) 
as follows: 
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: 
. . . . 
 
 91. The “aggregate settlement” rule, Rule 1.8, is the best—and perhaps only—example 
of an existing Rule that acknowledges the differences between individual and mass litigation 
and settlements. See MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(g). 
 92. Silver & Baker, supra note 2, at 744. 
 93. These core provisions are the minimum participation thresholds and affirmations by 
plaintiffs’ counsel that they will recommend participation in the settlement to all eligible 
clients and will (seek judicial permission to) withdraw from representing any client who 
declines his or her settlement offer. See supra Part II.A–B, E. 
 94. These core provisions are the affirmations by plaintiffs’ counsel that they will cease 
advertising for new clients with similar claims against the defendant and will not represent 
any new, similar claimants. See supra Part II.C–D. 
 95. Given the role of repeat play in enforcing the current work-around language, the 
question arises of how large the windfall to defendants might be and how much the plaintiffs 
would gain by relaxing the restrictions of current Rule 5.6.  An amendment would certainly 
increase clarity and its associated benefits. 
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(b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is 
part of the settlement of a matter, except that a lawyer may include in such 
an agreement a promise not to represent, or advertise for, new clients in 
matters arising out of the same transaction or event as the settled matter. 
A formal Comment to the Rule would specify that a lawyer is not 
obligated to include such a promise simply because a client or defendant 
requests it.  A second Comment would require that any supplemental 
compensation to be paid by the defendant in exchange for the lawyer’s 
promise must be included in the total settlement payment to be made for the 
covered clients’ claims. 
This amendment and the first Comment are similar to, but importantly 
different from, those proposed by Stephen Gillers and Richard Painter.96  
Although I share many of the concerns that motivate their proposal for 
relaxing the existing prohibitions of Rule 5.6(b), I am eager to avoid any 
side payments to the lawyer in exchange for “no-sue” or “no-advertising” 
restrictions.  My concern is to minimize any incentive for the lawyer to 
lowball the settlement value of the client’s claims to obtain a larger side 
payment for herself.97  A restriction that would permit the lawyer to 
negotiate a personal side payment from the defendant in exchange for a no-
sue promise, but “only after the terms of the plaintiff’s settlement are set,”98 
does not provide sufficient safeguards in this respect.99  Indeed, such a 
limitation seems to be little different than the frequently condemned 
practice of a defendant negotiating a consulting arrangement with a 
plaintiffs’ lawyer promptly after negotiating an agreement to settle the 
claims of that lawyer’s clients.100  Under either scenario, one is left to 
wonder whether some (or all) of the defendant’s separate payment to the 
attorney would have been included in her clients’ total settlement value in 
the absence of the “later negotiated” side agreement.  Thus, the better 
option is to require any no-sue or no-advertising restriction to be included 
in the mass tort settlement agreement and for the value of such restrictions 
to be similarly included in the total settlement value of the covered clients’ 
claims, thereby providing the finality premium to both the settling claimants 
and their lawyer. 
 
 96. See Gillers & Painter, supra note 55, at 319. 
 97. This amendment might also be expected to improve perceptions of attorney loyalty 
relative to the lawyer changing sides, as well as difficult questions about when exactly 
negotiations regarding the lawyer’s separate side payment began. 
 98. Gillers & Painter, supra note 55, at 320.  Gillers and Painter are also willing to have 
the attorney renegotiate the fee to be paid by the clients in light of a no-sue promise 
negotiated between the attorney and the defendant. See id.  This option is even more rife 
with problems and should not be permitted. 
 99. Among other things, it seems too easy for the defendant and the plaintiffs’ lawyer to 
anticipate such a “later” negotiation and to plan accordingly when setting the settlement 
value of the clients’ claims, even if nothing is said by either party until after the agreement to 
settle the clients’ claims is signed. 
 100. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
1968 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
CONCLUSION 
Both for plaintiffs and defendants, the benefits of comprehensive finality 
in nonclass aggregate settlements are highly likely to exceed the costs.  The 
existing Rules of Professional Responsibility, however, constrain rather 
than facilitate the parties’ ability to craft mutually beneficial, optimally 
comprehensive settlements.  And the question we are left with is, “Why?”  
Or, rather, “Who?” 
Who benefits when Rule 5.6(b) precludes a defendant from paying a 
premium to obtain straightforward, enforceable promises in an aggregate 
settlement agreement that plaintiffs’ counsel will cease advertising for new 
clients with similar claims against the defendant and will not represent any 
new, similar claimants?  And who benefits when plaintiffs (and their 
counsel) are unable to reap the entire available finality premium because the 
settlement agreement can employ only the work-around “no present 
intention” language rather than the desired straightforward, enforceable 
promises?  Those critical of, and eager to restrict, the parties’ pursuit of 
comprehensive finality, including those who would retain Rule 5.6(b) in its 
current form, owe us answers to these questions. 
 
